Introduction
Evolutionary individuals are units of selection and must satisfy Darwin's conditions of heritability and variation in ®tness. A theory for the origin of a new higher-level individual, such as the evolutionary transition from single cell to multicellular organisms, must explain how Darwin's properties emerge at the new level, out of the population biology of interacting lower level units. Although we believe a general set of principles guide the evolution of new individuals, to help ®x ideas, we consider the following scenario for the origin of multicellularity (Fig. 1) . Other scenarios are possible, although they also lead to the same set of general issues.
We assume that the single-celled ancestors of multicellular life were motile and able to alternate between reproductive and motile states (Margulis, 1981 (Margulis, , 1993 Buss, 1987; Maynard Smith & SzathmaÂ ry, 1995) . We assume that there was a trade o between cell division and motility, such that dividing cells were less likely to be motile, and motile cells were less likely to divide. This constraint might have been related to the existence of a ®nite number of microtubule organizing centres per cell (Margulis, 1981 (Margulis, , 1993 Buss, 1987) and/or to the existence of a cell wall (Kirk, 1997) . The trade-o between motility and reproduction exists in several protist groups, such as choanoagellates (thought to be the direct ancestors of the sponges), although many other protist groups, such as wall-less green agellates, have solved this constraint and can reproduced while motile (Kirk, 1997) . Nevertheless, Margulis and Buss argue that modern metazoans inherited this constraint between cell division and motility (Margulis, 1981; Buss, 1987) . Motile cells divide more slowly in extant multicellular organisms like Pleodorina in the Volvocales (Bell & Koufopanou, 1991) or the sponge Leucosolenia (Buss, 1987) . Finally, we assume that the many advantages of larger size Ð like avoid predation (Boraas et al., 1998) or better homeostasis (Bell, 1985) Ð would favour single cells coming together or remaining together after cell division so as to form cell groups. Group formation could have been accomplished through the evolution of cell functions that promote group behaviour, for example, a cell adhesion molecule, structures that hold cells together in a group (e.g. collar structures in sponges), or a modi®cation that impedes separation of cells after division (e.g. cytoplasmic bridges in some volvocalean green algae). It is at this point that our investigations begin. If and when single cells began forming groups, motility would be altruistic, that is, costly to the cell (because the cell would divide more slowly), but bene®cial for the group (assuming it was advantageous for groups to be able to move). Reduced motility by loss of the¯agella is then a form of defection, as it allows greater reproductive capacity at the cell level (favoured by within-group selection). But, the loss of motility will be disadvantageous at the group level. According to this scenario, we are led to consider the fate of cooperation and defection in a multilevel selection setting during the initial phases of the transition from unicellular to multicellular organisms.
The example given in Fig. 1 generalizes in interesting ways to other evolutionary transitions, in which pre-existing traits with antagonistic pleiotropic eects on ®tness at the lower level provide the basis for group bene®cial traits. Life history evolution is replete with examples of traits with antagonistic pleiotropic eects on ®tness, traits that increase one component of ®tness while decreasing another. For example, allocation of energy to reproduction often decreases survivorship. For the colonial group in Fig. 1 , cell motility detracts from cell reproduction and vice versa. For solitary organisms, individual selection balances these con¯icting demands. However, what happens when the once solitary organism lives in a group and the bene®ts of these pleiotropic traits also act at a group level? Group selection may shift the trait away from the individual optimal state to one that is more bene®cial to the group, even if this is costly to the individual. That is a possibility with the scenario assumed here, and it is also thought to occur during other evolutionary transitions, such as in the origin of eusociality in insects, in which group level traits such as division of labour can emerge from the existing variance in behaviours among organisms (Fewell & Page, 1999) .
Theoretical framework
We take a multi-level selection approach to evolutionary transitions, ®tness variation and heritability. This approach has proved successful in understanding other transitions, such as the origin of sociality and the origin of cooperative gene networks. The basic problem in creating new evolutionary individuals involves generating heritable variation in ®tness at the group level, while reducing the variation in ®tness and scope for evolutionary change within groups. The group must become an individual: how can this occur?
Variation in ®tness depends upon many processes and factors, including reproductive mode (e.g. asexual, sexual, fragmentation), reproductive specialization of group members (e.g. germ vs. soma in multicellular organisms or reproductive and worker castes in social insects), development and mutation. Understanding how these factors were shaped during the transition to multicellularity is a major concern of our work in this area (Michod, 1996 (Michod, , 1997 (Michod, , 1999 Michod & Roze, 1997 , 1999 Roze & Michod, 2000) .
Cooperation
We assume that the transition to multicellularity was fuelled by the bene®ts of cooperation and the advantages of large size. Cooperation is fundamental to the emergence of new levels of ®tness in the biological hierarchy, because cooperation increases the ®tness of the group, and new units of selection start out as groups of previously existing units. Thirty years ago, the study of cooperation received far less attention than other forms of ecological interaction (competition, predation and parasitism) . What began as the study of animal social behaviour (Wilson, 1975) , has now embraced the study of interactions at all biological levels. Cooperation is now seen as a primary creative force behind greater levels of complexity and organization in biology (Michod, 1999) and human culture (Wright, 2000) . This is not to say that cooperation is the only force leading to higher-level units. Indeed, concerning another evolutionary transition Ð that of the origin of the eukaryotic cell Ð numerous evolutionary scenarios have been proposed and they involve almost every form of ecological interaction, from exploitative predator±prey (Sagan, 1967; Cavalier-Smith, 1987; Guerrero, 1991) or parasitic/pathogen (Blackstone, 1995; Kroemer, 1997) type interactions, to commensalistic (Margulis, 1981; Blackstone, 1995; Martin & MuÈ ller, 1998; Blackstone & Green, 1999) and mutualistic (Blackstone, 1995; Moreira & Lopez-Garcia, 1998; Blackstone & Green, 1999; Lopez-Garcia & Moreira, 1999) interactions.
While it may be easy to agree on the basic role played by cooperation in the diversi®cation of life, cooperation remains a dicult interaction to understand and model. When there is just one kind of cooperator (a single cooperative genotype), the cooperators must belong to the same species; when there is more than one kind of cooperator, the cooperators may belong to the same or dierent species. The study of cooperation has traditionally been divided by the issue of whether the interactions occur within or between species, however, both situations require spatial and or temporal correlations in the behaviour of cooperating individuals. That is to say there must be structure in the distribution of behaviours (Michod & Sanderson, 1985) . In the case of within-species interactions, genetic structure may facilitate behavioural structure as in kin selection. Because of the need for behavioural structure, competition may also occur among members of cooperative groups and this may reduce the advantages of cooperation (Taylor, 1992) or lead to the loss of cooperative types as in viscous populations (Queller, 1994) . In the hypercycle, competitive exclusion of cooperative types is overcome by their cooperative interactions (Eigen & Schuster, 1979; Frank, 1995 Frank, , 1997 . Although the cooperative interactions make it ecologically stable, the hypercycle is evolutionarily unstable, without some kind of group structure, because of the problem of sel®sh mutants (Maynard Smith, 1979; Michod, 1983 Michod, , 1999 Boerlijst & Hogeweg, 1991; Grey et al., 1995) .
The number of dierent kinds of cooperators also aects how cooperation is modelled. When there is just a single kind of cooperator, game theoretic payo matrices are often used to conceptualize the interaction, as in the well-studied Prisoner's dilemma game. The payo matrix approach can be extended to interactions between two species (Law, 1991) . When there are multiple members involved in the interaction, dierent approaches are used such as the hypercycle model (Eigen & Schuster, 1979; Frank, 1995) or stochastic corrector model (Grey et al., 1995) .
Another major issue in the study of cooperation concerns the nature of the bene®ts bestowed by cooperators. A fundamental question is whether cheating (obtaining the bene®ts of cooperation without paying the costs) is possible. Synergism occurs when bene®ts received from cooperation require the recipient to participate in the interaction. In other words, it is not possible for an individual to receive the (synergistic) bene®ts of cooperative acts of others without itself cooperating; defection or cheating is either disadvantageous or not possible.
Some of the scenarios for the origin of the eukaryotic cell assume that cooperation is synergistic (Lopez-Garcia & Moreira, 1999) . Synergism requires non-linearities in the contribution to ®tness of each partner's behaviour. If we let the variables X and Y be the cooperative propensity of each partner, under an additive model of cooperation, ®tness of each partner would be a linear function of these propensities. Cheating is possible for linear models, because one individual could have zero propensity to cooperate but still bene®t from the cooperative acts of its partner. Synergism requires nonlinear ®tness functions. For example, if we wanted there to be no bene®ts unless both partners cooperated, we might let each partner gain in proportion to the product of the cooperative propensities. If one partner did not cooperate, neither would receive any bene®ts. Other more realistic functions are possible, of course, however, our main point is that synergism requires nonlinear ®tness eects of the interaction.
A problem with synergism alone as a scenario for the origin of cooperation is that it has diculty explaining how cooperation gets started in a population of non-cooperators. If there is one kind of cooperator, say C, interacting with defectors, D, we may model the interaction in terms of the familiar payo matrix given in Table 1 .
If a > c, we say there is synergism (Maynard Smith, 1998) , cooperation is stable, and cheating is not possible when cooperation is established in the population. However, even in this case (a > c), if cooperators pay a cost when their partner is not cooperating (b < d) cooperation cannot invade when rare because cooperators interact predominately with defectors. One way around this problem is to assume that cooperation is neutral when associated with defection, b d. Explaining the origin of cooperation is a special virtue of kin selection. Kinship among individuals provides the requisite behavioural structure locally (say, within families), and cooperation can increase (because cooperators tend to be concentrated in certain families) even though cooperators are rare in the global population.
Another important issue in understanding cooperation is whether the bene®ts contributed by dierent cooperators are similar or dierent in kind (Queller, 1997) . Sharing food is an example where the cooperating members provide similar bene®ts that are of the same kind and hence exchangeable. In contrast, role specialization in the castes of a termite colony, or cell and tissue specialization in a multicellular organism are both situations where the cooperators provide dierent kinds of bene®ts and one kind of bene®t cannot be exchanged for another. The specialization of reproductive function into germ cells (and the creation of somatic cells) is another example of non-exchangeable bene®ts. The distinction made by Maynard Smith & SzathmaÂ ry (1995) between rowing and sculling games expresses a similar issue. In rowing games, the oarsmen row on dierent sides of the boat (and so provide dierent and non-exchangeable functions). In sculling games, each oarsmen rows on both sides simultaneously (and so provides similar and exchangeable functions). The distinction is important, because cheating is much more costly in rowing games than in sculling games. In both kinds of games, the cooperators are in the same boat, which is another way of representing spatial and temporal correlations, that is behavioural structure.
Synergism may occur between functionally similar (sharing food, rowing games) or dissimilar members (sculling games, interspecies mutualisms). Synergism among functionally similar members must come from the economics of scale (Queller, 1997) . Alliances of similar members must draw their (synergistic) bene®ts from the numbers of these members, in other words from scale. For example, larger colonies may be more buered from environmental disturbances (Bell, 1985) or less likely to be eaten (Boraas et al., 1998) , and these may be some of the advantages to forming early groups as in Fig. 1 .
Multi-level selection and mutation
We wish to understand how ®tness emerges at a new higher level out of the frequency-dependent interactions of lower level units. It is well know that frequency-dependent selection does not usually increase the ®tness of the group (Wright, 1969), so how is it that group ®tness may increase in magnitude and heritability? Cooperation creates new levels of ®tness by increasing the ®tness of the group, and, if costly at the lower level, by trading ®tness from the lower level (the costs of cooperation to group members) to the higher level (the bene®ts to the group) (Michod, 1999) . In Table 2 , we illustrate this for the case of the transition between independent cells and multicellular organisms. Just as cooperation creates new levels of ®tness, it creates the opportunity for con¯ict between levels as deleterious mutants arise and spread. We assume that cell groups start out as ospring groups composed of N cells (Michod & Roze, 1999 , 2000 Roze & Michod, 2000) . During development, cells proliferate and die (possibly at dierent rates depending on cell behaviour) to create the adult cell group. This produces ospring groups of the next generation, either by producing propagules or by direct fragmentation (Fig. 2) . Deleterious mutation may occur during cell division leading to the loss of cooperative cell functions (such as the propensity to become motile in Fig. 1 ) and a decrease in ®tness of the group.
We have studied two dierent kinds of cooperation, depending upon whether the cooperative phenotype is costly or bene®cial at the cell level. When costly, cooperation is assumed to lower the cell's replication or survival rate. When bene®cial, cooperation bene®ts the cell as well as the adult group, and so cooperation is synergistic. If we imagine ospring groups of two players (pair-wise encounters of C cells and mutant D cells) and assume that the elements of the payo matrix in Table 1 represent the adult organism ®tnesses after development, groups starting from CC cells are always ®tter as adults than groups starting from CD cells (a > c in Table 1 ). Costly forms of cooperation may also be synergistic, depending on the magnitude of the costs and other parameters.
Adult group ®tness is assumed to increase with group size and functionality, and group functionality increases with the frequency of cooperative cells. The aect of mutation on group size depends on whether mutant cells replicate faster (sel®sh) or slower (uniformly deleterious) than non-mutant cells. Mutant cells, by virtue of not displaying the cooperative phenotype, decrease the functionality of the group. We believe that both kinds of mutations, sel®sh and uniformly deleterious, are important for understanding the evolution of cooperation and ®tness heritability during the origin of multicellularity. We have studied such mutations using a variety of deterministic and stochastic techniques that allow us to study a distribution of mutational eects (from uniformly deleterious to sel®sh) (Roze & Michod, 2000; Michod & Roze, 2000) . In general, we have found that even a small proportion of sel®sh mutations (that is, most mutations being uniformly deleterious with a small fraction of sel®sh mutations) has signi®cant eects on the evolution of genetic modi®ers of the life cycle that change heritable ®tness variation at the two levels.
Reproductive mode
Figure 2 presents three basic modes of reproduction that we have considered: fragmentation, aggregation and spore or zygote reproduction. In all three cases, the sequence of life cycle events involve the creation of a founding propagule or ospring group of cells of size N. This ospring group could be a single cell if N 1, as in the case of spore or zygote reproduction. Indeed the case of spore reproduction can be seen as the limiting case of both fragmentation and aggregation modes (by setting N 1). We have also considered the case of alternating fragmentation and spore reproduction every v generations (Michod & Roze, 1999) . A fundamental dierence between aggregation and the other reproductive modes is the opportunity for horizontal transfer of mutants to cell groups that contain no mutant cells. This is important because aggregation continually re-establishes mixed groups and concomitantly the opportunity for within-group selection and con¯ict between the two levels of selection. Propagule size, N, in¯uences ®tness in several ways. First, propagule size aects the within-and between-group variance and opportunity for selection at the two levels. Smaller N increases the between-group variance and decreases the withingroup variance. Second, propagule size has direct eects on ®tness, because smaller N increases the number of possible fragments, but decreases adult size. We ®nd that the direct eects of propagule size dominate the indirect eects in the evolution of reproductive mode, except when some mutations are sel®sh, in which case the opportunity for selection at the two levels becomes the critical factor aecting the evolution of N.
Con¯ict mediation
We wish to understand how heritability of ®tness, the de®ning characteristic of a unit of selection, may increase at the group level, so that the group may become an evolutionary individual. To continually adapt to its environment, an evolutionary individual must have mechanisms and features, such as a germ line or self-policing functions, which mediate con¯ict and reduce the opportunity for within-group change. These features shape development and the options of cells, thereby restricting the evolutionary potential of cells in favour of the group and, in so doing, make the group indivisible, that is, an individual.
Using the multilevel selection framework outlined above, we have estimated the levels of cooperation maintained in cell groups under various models of mutation, mutation load, ®tness variation at the two levels (cell and cell group) and reproductive system (Michod, 1996 (Michod, , 1997 Michod & Roze, 1999; Roze & Michod, 2000) . Under what conditions can evolution select for genetic modi®ers of development, so as to increase the opportunity for between-group change, restrict the opportunity for within-group change and facilitate an evolutionary transition to multicellular individuals?
To understand the conditions under which an evolutionary transition occurs, we posit a modi®er locus that modi®es the biological processes described above (e.g. development, reproductive system, within-organism mutation and selection, and cell±cell interactions such as cooperation). Unlike the classical use of modi®er models, say in the evolution of dominance and recombination, the modi®ers studied in the present paper are not neutral. Instead, they have direct eects on ®tness at the cell and organism level by changing the parameters of withinorganism change. By moulding the ways in which the levels interact so as to reduce con¯ict among cells, for example by segregating a germ line early or by policing the sel®sh tendencies of cells, the modi®ers construct the ®rst true emergent organism-level functions.
The modi®er allele can aect virtually any aspect of the model, however, we have focused on three kinds of modi®ers. A germ line modi®er aects the way in which cells are chosen to be propagules and is assumed to sequester a group of cells that have a shorter development time and possibly a lower mutation rate than the soma, and, consequently, less selection at the cell level. A self-policing modi®er causes cells in the group to spend time and energy monitoring other cells and reducing the advantages of defection, possibly at some cost to the group. An apoptotic modi®er is more direct and is expressed by the mutant renegade cells themselves and lowers the rate of proliferation (or probability of survival) of mutated cells. When these modi®ers of development and within-organism change increase in the population, the level of cooperation increases as does the heritability of ®tness at the group level. Figure 3 considers the evolution of a germ line modi®er. As the modi®er evolves, the average heritable ®tness of the group Fig. 3 Eect of evolutionary transition on ®tness. The eect of an evolutionary transition on the heritability of ®tness at the group and the cell level is shown as a function of the deleterious mutation rate for the case of (a) cell±cell altruism (sel®sh mutations) and (b) cell synergism (uniformly deleterious mutations). In both cases, the basic eect of modi®er evolution is to increase the relative heritability of ®tness at the group level compared to the cell level. Calculation of average organism ®tness and cell ®tness and construction of the ®gure is explained in Section 6 of Michod & Roze (1999) .
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increases, while the average ®tness of the cells decreases. Both these eects increase with the mutation rate. When cooperation is bene®cial at both levels, mutations are deleterious at both levels, and one may think that there is no con¯ict between the two levels of selection. However, as the modi®ers evolve during the transition to multicellularity, ®tness at the group level increases more than at the cell level as shown in Fig. 3(b) .
Why do groups fare better than cells after the evolution of con¯ict modi®ers that reduce the eective mutation rate? Modi®ers evolve in this case by virtue of increasing the heritability of ®tness in the more ®t non-mutant (cooperative) subpopulation (Michod & Roze, 1999) . When cooperation is bene®cial at both levels, on average both cells and cell groups are ®tter after the transition, because the modi®er decreases the eective mutation rate and mutation is deleterious at both levels. However, cell groups bene®t twice from the lower mutation rate, because of their much larger size and enhanced functionality. To put the matter another way, when cooperation is bene®cial at both levels, cell ®tness may not be directly increased by mutation; however, relative to cell groups, cell ®tness is increased, because groups are harmed more by mutation than are cells.
Discussion and overview
The theory reviewed here was originally developed for heuristic reasons, however, the basic variables and parameters are measurable and are in the process of being studied in dierent systems. For example, the theory has recently been applied (Blackstone & Ellison, 2000) to the origin of basic developmental plans in multicellular animals in the late preCambrian some 600 million years ago (Davidson et al., 1995; Ransick et al., 1996) . Davidson et al. propose certain features of early metazoans, including small size, a small and ®xed number of cell divisions in early development, and speci®ca-tion of cell fates prior to cell movement. These features imply constraints on certain parameters of our model, speci®cally t (the time available for cell division) and b (the bene®t to cells of not cooperating in terms of their rate of replication) (Blackstone & Ellison, 2000) . Such constraints clearly enhance between-cell cooperation and allow multicellularity to evolve more easily. Nevertheless, these constraints were circumvented by the evolution of set-aside cells, that is, undierentiated cells that retain inde®nite division potential. Our theory predicts that the evolution of set-aside cells must be accompanied by new features (new con¯ict mediators) which mediate cell±cell competition, and comparative data support this prediction (Ransick et al., 1996) : the evolution of set-aside cells in metazoans was accompanied by the evolution of the sequestration of the germ line.
A corollary of our hypothesis is that having a germ line becomes more and more advantageous as organisms increase in size, since the frequency of mutants increases with development time and the number of cell divisions. A positive association of the occurrence of a germ line with organism size is also predicted by an alternative hypothesis based on division of labour (Bell, 1985) . This hypothesis states that the organism has a greater ®tness when some cells specialize in reproduction (the germ cells) and other cells specialize in other functions (the somatic cells), because each task can be performed more eciently (Koufopanou, 1994) . Furthermore, division of labour is assumed to be more fruitful in a big group than in a small one. According to both hypotheses, big organisms should be more likely to have a germ line. However, this conclusion need not be valid across taxa, because organisms from dierent taxa are subject to dierent constraints. For example, we expect that organisms from dierent taxa should dier in their susceptibility to sel®sh mutants. In plants, for example, sel®sh mutants do not have much opportunity to spread within the organism, because of the mechanical constraint of the rigid cell wall, whereas in animals cell mobility increases the risk of proliferation of sel®sh cells. Therefore, having a germ line could be more advantageous for a small animal than for a large plant. Comparisons between closely related species are useful, because these species may be subject to similar constraints. The Volvocales, for example, illustrate the association of larger size with earlier germ±soma dierentiation (Bell, 1985) , in agreement with the division of labour and con¯ict mediation hypotheses.
What happens during an evolutionary transition to a new higher-level unit of individuality, in this case the multicellular organism? Our theory assumes that the march towards multicellularity is fuelled by the advantages of cooperation and large size. Cooperation increases the ®tness of the new higher-level unit, and, in this way, cooperation may create new levels of selection. However, the evolution of cooperation sets the stage for con¯ict, represented here by the increase of deleterious mutants within the emerging organism that tilt the balance of selection in favour of the lower level, cells in our case. The evolution of modi®ers restricting the opportunity for selection among cells is the ®rst higher-level function at the organism level. Before the evolution of a means to reduce con¯ict between levels of selection, the evolution of new group adaptations (such as the underlying traits leading to increased cooperation among cells) is frustrated by deleterious mutations. Individuality requires more than just cooperation among a group of genetically related cells, whether the cooperation is altruistic or synergistic; individuality depends upon the emergence of higher level functions that restrict the opportunity for con¯ict within and ensure the continued cooperation of the lower level units. Con¯ict leads Ð through the evolution of adaptations that reduce it Ð to greater individuality and harmony for the organism.
